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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the world’s youngest constitutions, the Constitution of Kosovo not 
only summarises the international community’s prescribed obligations 
towards Kosovo’s polity and establishes the polity per se, but also determines 
Kosovo’s governing system and prescribes the rights and liberties of 
Kosovo’s citizens. The constitution also determines the extra rights of ethnic 
minorities and assigns guarantees for their participation in public life. The 
constitution, moreover, specifies its relationship with the Ahtisaari Plan and 
lays out the international civilian representative’s position in Kosovo. To 
better understand these attributes, this paper shall conduct both a legal review 
of the Kosovan Constitution and draw some conclusions about the governing 
system and model of democracy established by the constitution.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the days following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
successful deployment of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1244. Fourteen members of the 
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Security Council voted for the resolution, none opposed it, and China 
abstained.4 Issued under the authorisation of the United Nations Charter,5 this 
resolution established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and authorized UN peacekeeping forces.6 The resolution 
directed UNMIK to establish a civilian administration in Kosovo, with the 
goal of building provisional and self-governing Kosovan institutions.7 As the 
first steps toward developing democratic institutions, UNMIK adopted the 
Constitutional Framework for Kosovo,8 which not only established Kosovan 
transitional institutions, but also provided domestic legitimacy for the 
UNMIK’s powers in Kosovo, in addition to the constraints implied vis-à-vis 
the Kosovan provisional institutions. The constitutional framework did not 
imply any sovereign powers for the provisional institutions, however, it did 
establish most of the basic institutional structures of a polity. During the 
transitional phase, the framework generally has been considered a de-facto 
constitution of Kosovo,9 and as such acknowledges the attributes of a state 
that it created throughout Kosovan public life. 
In October 2005, following international developments surrounding the 
Kosovo issue, the Security Council authorized the initiation of the 
international settlement process on Kosovo’s status. In addition, the Security 
Council embraced the secretary general’s attempts to begin the negotiation 
process between Kosovan representatives and Serbia, as foreseen in 
Resolution 1244.10 As a consequence, the secretary general appointed Marti 
Ahtisaari to be the special envoy for the future status of Kosovo.11 Ahtisaari’s 
responsibilities included organizing the negotiation process between the 
Kosovan people’s representatives12 and Serbian institutions. If it appeared that 
                                                     
4 UN DOC. S/RES/1244 (1999) of June 10 1999. 
5 See Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. 
6 See paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244 (UN DOC. S/RES/1244 (1999) of June 10 
1999), which authorizes the secretary general to deploy a civilian mission in Kosovo.   
7 Matheson M J “United Nations governance of post-conflict societies” (2001) The 
American Journal of International Law Vol 95 no 1 76–85. 
8 UNMIK Regulation on Constitutional framework for provisional self-government in 
Kosovo No 2001/9. 
9 Weller M Contested statehood: Kosovo’s struggle for independence (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
10 UN Doc S/PRST/2005/51. 
11 UN Doc S/2005/708 and S/2005/709. 
12The Serbian government did not accept the idea that representatives of the Kosovan 
people are, simultaneously represent both Kosovans and the local Serbian community 
in Kosovo. However, legally, the Kosovan negotiating party included members of 
ethnic minorities – as provided by the international community’s prescription; thereby 
the representatives of the Kosovan people also represent the Serbian minority in 
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the negotiating parties could not reach agreement, the UN tasked Ahtisaari 
with drafting a proposal for the determination of Kosovo’s status in accord 
with the Contact Group’s policy on Kosovo’s status.13 
The negotiations between the Kosovan people’s representatives and 
Serbian institutions failed14 because of disagreement over Kosovo’s 
international status. Serbia insisted that Kosovo could not become a state, 
whereas the Kosovan people’s representatives claimed that the only 
acceptable solution was an independent Kosovo.15 Nevertheless, as Ker-
Lindsay argues, “the status process was not about discussing status options, 
such as autonomy—instead, it was about creating the structures for a Kosovo 
state.”16 Following the failure of negotiations, Marti Ahtisaari drafted a plan 
for Kosovo’s status, called the Ahtisaari Plan,17 and sent it to the Security 
Council for adoption.18 Despite the secretary general’s endorsement of the 
Ahtisaari Plan, the council did not approve it because of fundamental 
disagreements among council members.19 20 Thus, Resolution 1244 remained 
in force.21  
Following these developments, the United States and its European allies 
began to search for a solution that would employ the Ahtisaari Plan while still 
                                                                                                                               
Kosovo (see the statements of the Negotiating Group of Kosovo, delivered through 
the Kosovan President).  
13 UN Doc S/2005/709. The Contact Group’s policy upon Kosovo’s status prescribed 
three prohibitions: no union with another country, no return to the pre-1999 position 
and no partition of Kosovo.  
14 Erler G “Kosovo - 120 days after the Constitution’s adoption” (2008) Sudosteuropa 
Mitteilungen. Vol  05-06 16–21. 
15 Kostovva D “Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari 
Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective” (2008) International 
Peacekeeping. Vol  15 no 5 631–647. 
16 Ker-Lindsay J  “From autonomy to independence: The Evolution of International 
Thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005” (2009) Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies Vol 11 no 2 141–156 (quoted from page 153). 
17 ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ is a short name for the international Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement of 2007, proposed by the United Nations Office of 
Special Envoy for Kosovo (Ahtisaari Plan, in the official form, is UN Doc. 
S/2007/168/Ad 1, March 26 2007).    
18 UN Doc S/2007/168 of  March 26 2007. 
19 For the importance of a Security Council-approved settlement for Kosovo’s status, 
see the Contact Group Minister’s Statement on Kosovo, S263/2007, September 27 
2007.  
20 UN Doc S/2007/168 of March 26 2007. 
21 Serbia holds that Resolution 1244 prohibits the Kosovan Declaration of 
Independence. See a comprehensive report on this at: Security Council Report, 
Kosovo, Update Report No 1, March 10 2008. Available at: 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3945613/>. 
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following Resolution 1244’s prescriptions. In the meantime, under close 
supervision by the international community, the Kosovan people’s 
representatives declared Kosovo’s independence, requesting recognition from 
individual states.22 The Kosovan Declaration of Independence stated that 
Kosovo shows its appreciation for an international mission through the 
European Union and acknowledges the Ahtisaarian obligations over Kosovo’s 
polity.23 Still, because of the deadlock in the Security Council over a joint 
accord about Kosovo, the United States and the main European powers 
decided to recognise unilaterally Kosovo’s independence.24 
In the meantime, although the European Union (EU) had shown its 
unwillingness to deploy a mission without clear authorization from Resolution 
1244, either through the Security Council or the secretary general,25 it 
replaced UNMIK with the European security and defence policy (ESDP) 
mission in Kosovo in the post-status phase. Hence, in a joint interaction 
between the UN Secretary General, the United States and the European 
Union, these actors agreed to make a place for the ESDP mission in Kosovo 
and transfer most of the existing powers of UNMIK to the ESDP mission.26 
Therefore, the European Union mission in Kosovo27—the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, known as EULEX—took over the 
responsibility of supervising the Kosovan institutions’ independence along 
with European Union Special Representative (EUSR).28 The European Union 
also assigned the EUSR the duties of the International Civilian Representative 
(ICR), as requested by the Ahtisaari Plan. The EUSR nominee, Peter Faith, 
was, therefore, confirmed both as the EUSR and the ICR.29 It is important to 
                                                     
22 Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, February 17 2008. 
23 This declaration accepted the international constraints upon Kosovo, and 
recognized the significance and position of the Ahtisaari Plan, Kostovicova, D 
“Legitimacy and International Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo 
from a Human Security Perspective” (2008) International Peacekeeping Vol 15 no 5 
631–647). 
24 Advancing freedom and democracy reports: Kosovo: United States Departament of  
State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. May 2008. 
25 Council of the European Union, 6496/08 (Presse 41) Press Release 2851st Council’s 
Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, February 18 2008. 
26 UN Doc S/2008/354, UN Doc S/2008/458, and UN Doc S/2008/692. 
27 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of February 4 2008 on the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX-Kosovo, Official Journal of the European 
Union L42/92.  
28 Council Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP, February 04 2008 Appointing a European 
Union Special Representative in Kosovo. Official Journal of the European Union, 
L42/88. 
29 Press Statement, First Meeting of the International Steering Group (ISG) for 
Kosovo, February 28 2008, paragraph 3, Vienna. 
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note that the ICR “was modeled after the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose powers to override the local legislative 
decisions and rule by decree have, since 1995, illustrated the pitfalls of 
building democracy by undemocratic means”.30  
Given this, one may consider Kosovo’s statehood-building31 as an 
internationally driven process that culminated in the Ahtisaari Plan.32 The plan 
provided broad guarantees for the protection of the Serbian minority in a 
sovereign Kosovo, including a deep decentralization process that favoured the 
Serbian minority.33 Although the plan was not formally adopted in the 
Security Council, it did determine substantial and formal matters in relation to 
the establishment of Kosovo’s statehood, which, inter alia, implied that 
Kosovo should have a constitution. As a result, as specified by the Ahtisaari 
Plan,34 the Kosovan president appointed a multi-ethnic Constitutional 
Commission, responsible for composing and proposing a draft of the Kosovan 
Constitution.35 Closely supervised by many international representatives, the 
work of the commission, reflected the international community’s concern – 
and perhaps even their desired outcomes – for the constitution.36 However, as 
Marko argues, this process resulted in a lack of legitimacy, which, in turn, has 
forced the Albanian political elites in Kosovo to face a sharp drop in popular 
legitimacy.37  
                                                     
30 Kostovicova D  “Legitimacy and international administration: The Ahtisaari 
Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security Perspective” (2008) International 
Peacekeeping  Vol 15 no 5: 631.647 (at 636). 
31 For more about the Kosovan state-building process, see Kosovo’s fragile transition, 
International Crisis Group. Europe Report, No 196  September 25 2008. 
32 Kostovicova argues that Ahtisaari Plan has two main attributes: first, the plan 
delivers a communitarian and territorial approach; and second, the plan prescribes the 
supervision upon Kosovo’s polity (Kostovicova D  “Legitimacy and international 
administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security 
Perspective” (2008) International Peacekeeping Vol 15 no 5: 631–647). 
33 Tansey O  Kosovo “Independence and Tutelage” (2009) Journal of Democracy Vol  
20 no 2 153–166. 
34 See the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, February 26 
2007, Article 10.   
35 Decree of the Kosovan President on the appointment of the Kosovan Constitutional 
Commission, February 19 2008. Accessed at  (March 30 2010): 
http://www.kosovoconstitution.info/repository/docs/VENDIMI%20I%20PRESIDEN
TIT%20per%20KKK.pdf. 
36 For more about the ethnic minorities’ representatives and international involvement 
in the Kosovan constitution-making process, see: Tunheim, J “Rule of law and the 
Kosovo Constitution” (2009)  Min J Int’l L  18 371. 
37 Marko J “The new Kosovo Constitution in a Regional Comparative Perspective 
“(2008) Review of Central and East European Law Vol 33 437–450. 
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Following the proposal of the Kosovan Constitutional Commission and 
the decree by Kosovo’s president, the representatives of the Kosovan people 
adopted the Kosovan Constitution on April 9, 2008. This acknowledged the 
international community’s constraints, made manifest in the constitution, 
upon Kosovo’s polity. The Kosovan Constitution entered into force on June 
15, 2008, when most of the powers of the UNMIK already had been 
transferred to the Kosovan polity and the ESDP mission in Kosovo. Kosovo’s 
Constitution complemented the establishment of Kosovo’s statehood by 
providing it with a domestic legal origin. Moreover, the constitution not only 
established and/or recognized the international community’s constraints upon 
Kosovo’s polity, it also recognized the international community’s civilian 
presence in Kosovo. As such, the International Civilian Representative (ICR) 
– who was also simultaneously the EUSR – certified Kosovo’s constitution as 
being in accordance with the Comprehensive Status Proposal for Kosovo 
(Ahtisaari Plan).38 Hence, the global community, via this representation, 
acknowledged that the Kosovan Constitution followed both the spirit and the 
details of the Ahtisaari Settlement. In addition, the Kosovan constitution-
making process involved consulting with the citizens of Kosovo, including 
ethnic minorities; as a consequence, many of the citizens’ suggestions were 
included in the constitution.39 
In strict domestic terms, the Constitution of Kosovo provides a contested 
basis for a classic sovereign polity, given accepted limitations. Still, the 
Constitution delivers most of the statehood authorizations for the Kosovan 
polity and promotes a legal order with a somewhat unique configuration. In 
that context, Kosovo’s Constitution, in one way or another, subsumes the 
Kosovan legal system and declares superiority over the governing system of 
Kosovo. Therefore, the Constitution of Kosovo embeds a legal rationality into 
Kosovo’s statehood, providing a legal basis for its functioning. 
Kosovo’s constitution has many distinguishing features which might not 
be apparent in other ‘classic’ constitutions; however, these features are a 
product of the constrained sovereignty in Kosovo demanded by the 
international community. Given this context, one may then ask whether the 
Constitution of Kosovo is a ‘people’s constitution’. Of course, a number of 
criticisms have been put forth which contest the legitimacy of the 
                                                     
38 Press release of the Constitutional Commission of Kosovo, in regard to Peter 
Faith’s decision On the certification of the Kosovan Constitution, April 2 2008. 
Accessed at (March 25 2010): http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=1,203,1316. 
See also the press statement, Second meeting of the International Steering Group 
(ISG) for Kosovo,  April 17 2008, paragraph 4, Vienna.  
39 Press release of the Constitutional Commission of Kosovo, regarding the “inclusion 
of citizens’ recommendations in Kosovo’s Constitution”, March 4 2008. Accessed at 
(March 25 2010): http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=1,203,1296. 
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Constitution; nonetheless, it should be noted that the Constitution has been 
adopted by the Kosovan people’s representatives, despite the huge 
impositions made by the international community on both the Constitution 
and the constitutional development process. 
The Constitution consists of fourteen chapters and 154 articles, regulating 
both the formal and substantial matters of the state. Most importantly, it 
proclaims the style of Kosovo’s polity – its model of democracy and the basis 
upon which it functions. Moreover, it establishes and determines the circles of 
competences of the Assembly, the president, the government, and the 
judiciary. It also establishes a range of rights and liberties for Kosovo’s 
citizens – in addition to the extra guarantees that it delivers for the ethnic 
minorities. The constitution positions the state in the direction as that of the 
Ahtisaari Plan, accepting the ICR’s position in Kosovo.40 Ultimately, the 
Constitution determines the procedure for constitutional amendment and 
outlines the mode of transition from the previous legal order to the new one. 
Therefore, this paper, in addition to providing a general analysis of most 
of the matters mentioned above, reviews Kosovo’s Constitution in general. As 
such, it examines the proclamations delivered in the general provisions and 
then explores the governing system description within the Constitution. 
Following that, this paper focuses upon the rights and liberties section of the 
Constitution with special attention to the constitutional guarantees for ethnic 
minorities. Next, the study discusses the amendment procedure and the 
procedure’s legal and political consequences. Finally, this paper reviews the 
position of the Ahtisaari Plan in relation to the Constitution of Kosovo and 
discusses the legal implications.  
This paper concludes with the argument that Kosovo’s Constitution 
contains a significant number of constitutional innovations that, in a classical 
sense, may not have been seen previously. This review contends that 
Kosovo’s Constitution provides a limited basis for a classic polity.  
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF KOSOVO’S CONSTITUTION 
 
This section reviews the basic provisions of Kosovo’s Constitution 
(hereafter “Constitution”), focusing on Kosovo’s state principles. This part of 
the Constitution, to achieve certain objectives, delivers both formal 
proclamations and substantial obligations for Kosovo’s polity. This analysis 
begins with a survey of the Constitution’s preamble. 
In its preamble, the Constitution describes its aspirations and refers to the 
‘enactor’ of the Constitution. It opens with the famous phrase, “We, the 
people”, thereby acknowledging the people as the authors of the Constitution. 
                                                     
40 The International Civilian Representative’s powers are prescribed by the Ahtisaari 
Plan.  
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This statement illustrates the people’s determination to form a democratic and 
peace-loving state and proclaims Kosovo as a state for all of its citizens.41 The 
preamble also represents a commitment to guarantee the rights and liberties of 
all citizens and to promote social prosperity. Furthermore, the preamble 
proclaims the state of Kosovo’s determination to promote stability in the 
region and to be one of the world’s peace-loving countries. Finally, the 
preamble reveals Kosovo’s intention to become a member of the Euro-
Atlantic organizations. As such, the preamble of Kosovo’s Constitution 
dedicates most of its proclamations to the ‘peaceful’ character of the state 
entity being legally and formally established by this Constitution. The 
preamble does not refer to any historical event, unlike the constitutions of 
most other countries, and makes no indication of any ‘nationalistic pride’. 
Hence, one may consider the preamble a step toward making the state of 
Kosovo a nationalist-free country. There is no sign that the Constitution is 
authored by a single ethnicity, as opposed to an ethnically pluralistic 
Constitution; rather, the preamble refers to all of Kosovo’s citizens as its 
authors, whatever their ethnic background.  
Having surveyed the preamble, the basic provisions section of the 
Constitution will be examined next. In the first provision, Kosovo’s 
Constitution proclaims that: “The Republic of Kosovo is an independent, 
sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state”.42 Thus, the Constitution 
proclaims Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty. As a matter of such 
determinations, one may consider the Constitution to be the domestic legal 
foundation of sovereignty. Also within this provision, the Constitution 
designates democracy as the governmental format for Kosovo and describes 
Kosovo’s territory as unique and indivisible. The territorial “uniqueness and 
indivisibility” function as complementing principles of sovereignty and 
statehood. As will be discussed in this paper, apart from these particular 
proclamations and determinations, Kosovo’s statehood and sovereignty are 
neglected and/or constitutionally constrained.    
The Constitution specifies, “The Republic of Kosovo is a state of its 
citizens. The Republic of Kosovo exercises its authority based on the respect 
for human rights and freedoms of its citizens and all other individuals within 
its borders”.43 This sentence constitutionally proclaims Kosovo to be a 
citizens’ state – disregarding potential nation-state statehood, and sets forth 
the human rights dimension of the polity as a Constitutional principle.  
                                                     
41 The European Commission considers the Kosovan Constitution to be “a 
Constitution of a high European standard.” See Commission Staff Working 
Document: Kosovo under UNSCR1244/99 2008 Progress Report. Commission of the 
European Communities, SEC (2008) 2697, Brussels. 
42 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 1, para 1. 
43 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 1, para 2. 
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In light of this, one may argue that the Constitution of Kosovo establishes 
Kosovo as a state of its citizens but not as a state of a single ethnic group. As 
such, as John Rawls argues, “it is of a fundamental ideal of liberal democracy 
that all citizens should enjoy fully equal citizenship”.44 Since the Constitution 
shows no sign of privileging or recognizing any ethnic group, it both liberally 
governs and equally recognizes the citizens’ constitutional position; therefore 
the Constitution provides a statehood that is legally bound to the Kosovan 
citizens but not to any specific ethnic community. Furthermore, following 
Bernd Rechel’s findings,45 as far as the human rights dimension of the polity 
is concerned, human rights in Kosovo are important for a number of reasons. 
First, the importance of the proclamation of human rights in the Constitution 
of Kosovo stems from domestic factors: the historical legacies and domestic 
political crises in Kosovo have made the protection of minority rights crucial 
for the existence of a multi-ethnic polity. In addition, the international 
community’s conditionality regarding Kosovo’s statehood and the 
international community’s support for Kosovo have been directly linked with 
Kosovo’s respect for minority and human rights. Hence, the latter facts have 
affected directly the Constitution of Kosovo’s design. However, as Warbrick 
and McGoldrick argue, the Constitution attaches to itself the erga omnes duty 
to respect human rights and protect minorities. Thus, as Warbrick and 
McGoldrick assert, the human rights dimension of the Constitution of Kosovo 
touches the exact concern of the countries that must recognize and accept 
Kosovo’s statehood.46 Hence, the human rights dimension of the Constitution 
of Kosovo reflects the both the domestic and international aspirations of 
Kosovo.  
In this review, it is also important to discuss these provisions in the 
context of the Montevideo Convention. The Constitution of Kosovo refers to 
Kosovo’s territory as an element of the state and defines the relationship of 
the people who live in that territory to Kosovo’s statehood. In addition, the 
Constitution highlights the polity’s aspiration to participate in international 
diplomatic relations. From that perspective, the Constitution of Kosovo 
indeed proclaims the concepts of Kosovo’s state territory, population, 
sovereign government, and relations with other states and international 
organizations, as determined by Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on 
                                                     
44 Rawls in Conover P et al  “The elusive ideal of equal citizenship: Political theory 
and political psychology in the United States and Great Britain” (2004) The Journal 
of Politics  Vol  66 no 4 10–61.  
45 Rechel B Introduction in Rechel B ed Minority rights in Central and Eastern 
Europe. (New York: Routledge, 2009).   
46 Warbrick C and McGoldric, D  Kosovo “The Declaration of Independence” (2008) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol 57 675–690. 
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the Rights and Duties of States.47 Hence, one may argue that the Constitution 
of Kosovo prescribes, to the extent possible, the principles of the Montevideo 
Convention as a means of proclaiming statehood in a legal context.   
The subsequent constitutional provision declares that: “The Republic of 
Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, 
any State or part of any State”.48 Thus, Kosovo is constitutionally restrained 
from making a “territorial incursion” toward any nation that it could seize, 
and it should abstain from joining or seeking a union with any state. This is 
directly aimed at constitutionally prohibiting a potential ‘union’ of Kosovo 
with Albania – a real concern of the international community.  
Using a ‘Lincolnian’ approach, Kosovo’s Constitution proclaims that: 
“The sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo stems from the people, belongs 
to the people and is exercised in compliance with the Constitution through 
elected representatives, referendum and other forms in compliance with the 
provisions of this Constitution”.49 Thus, the Constitution establishes the 
peoples’ sovereignty as the method of governance, thereby acknowledging 
three principles: first, that sovereignty stems from the people; second, that 
sovereignty is exercised on behalf of the people; and third, that sovereignty is 
exercised via the peoples’ representatives and/or referenda. To that extent, the 
Constitution promotes ‘Lincolnian Democracy’.  
Following that section, the Constitution specifies that: “The sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kosovo is intact, inalienable, 
indivisible and protected by all means provided in this Constitution and the 
law”.50 Here the Constitution provides both a foundation and obligation for 
Kosovo’s polity to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty, meaning 
that external aggressions or internal secessions will be constitutionally fought. 
This is implicitly based on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which asks states 
to refrain from actions that interfere with a state’s territorial integrity and 
political independence. In addition, the above provision complements Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter, which requires the United Nations to refrain from 
intervening in domestic affairs, excluding the application of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.51 In light of Chapter VII, the ESDP’s mission in Kosovo 
could not be considered a breach to Kosovo’s territorial integrity as prescribed 
in Articles 2(4) and 2(7), given that the ESDP’s mission in Kosovo is derived 
                                                     
47 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1993, Article 1.  
48 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 1, para 3. 
49 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 2, para 1. 
50 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 2, para 2. 
51 United Nations Charter, Article 2, paras 4 & 7.  
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from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.52 Furthermore, the Constitution details 
Kosovo’s capacity to become part of international security alliances.53 This 
could be interpreted as being motivated by Kosovo’s intention to become a 
part of either NATO or ESDP, if integrated into the European Union. 
On the other hand, although the Constitution of Kosovo legally establishes 
Kosovo’s sovereignty, one may argue that, in the post-Cold War world, no 
state can be sovereign without being recognized internationally. This might 
lead us to examine the number of states that have recognized Kosovo;54 
however, we will approach this question by further digging into the 
Montevideo Convention, which specifies the following: 
 
“…the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by 
the other states. Even before recognition, the state has the right to 
defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation 
and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to 
legislate upon its interest, administer its services and to define the 
jurisdiction and competence of its courts”.55  
 
After reviewing the proclamations in Kosovo’s Constitution and reading 
the excerpt from the Montevideo Convention, one may argue that the 
proclamations for a fully fledged sovereignty have logical complmentarity 
with the spirit of the Montevideo Convention. As such, the proclamations 
alone, as the Montevideo Convention proscribes, play a role in the existence 
of Kosovo’s statehood.  
Even though the Constitution of Kosovo proclaims the territorial 
indivisibility of Kosovo, there are some territorial areas within Kosovo that 
are not effectively governed by Kosovo’s institutions. The Northern Mitrovica 
region of Kosovo is one such case; it remains (as of this writing) outside of 
the Constitution of Kosovo’s authority.56 This has led to the conclusion that, 
although the Constitution of Kosovo provides a basis for indivisible territorial 
sovereignty, its relevance in practice remains unrealistic in some places. So 
far, this has been one of the most egregious violations of the Constitution of 
                                                     
52 See a basic argument for this in: De Wet E  “The governance of Kosovo: Security 
Council Resolution 1244 and the establishment and functioning of EULEX” (2009) 
American Journal of International Law Vol  103 no 1 83–-96. 
53 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 2, paragraph 3.  
54 Sixty-five nations have recognized Kosovo’s independence to date, although the 
independence has not been recognized by the United Nations as a collective unit (see 
Kosovo’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, States that have recognized Kosovo. Available 
at: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=1,33).  
55 Montevideo Convention, Article 3.  
56 Freedom in the World Country Report 2009, Freedom House. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7757&year=2009).  
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Kosovo. The lack of constitutional supremacy in those sections has been 
associated with not only criminal resistance but also total institutional failure 
and negligence.57 Therefore, constitutional proclamations of territorial unity 
face enormous challenges in practice.58  
One of the most important proclamations and/or determinations that 
Kosovo’s Constitution delivers relates to the principle of multi-ethnicity. As 
such, the Constitution states that: “The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic 
society consisting of Albanian and other Communities, governed 
democratically with full respect for the rule of law through its legislative, 
executive and judicial institutions”.59 As a way of recognizing the equality of 
ethnic minorities’ positions with that of the Albanian majority,60 the 
Constitution establishes Kosovo as a multi-ethnic state. In that context, the 
Constitution does legally impose the multi-ethnicity principle as a basis for 
Kosovo’s polity. It then follows that the Constitution is, in that context, a 
multi-ethnic constitution, since the state that it legally produces is a multi-
ethnic state, having dismissed the governing principle of rule by the majority. 
To that end, Kosovo’s Constitution offers relatively rich protections for ethnic 
minorities, guaranteeing an equal state for all of its citizens61 by disregarding 
the majority’s ethnic background as a constitutional principle. Yet, although it 
is regarded as a principle, the Constitution employs this principle in almost 
every aspect of Kosovan institutional life, as will be discussed later. Hence, as 
Pond argues, this proclamation most substantially employs and consequently 
provides an over-proportional representation of minorities in institutional life, 
                                                     
57 Commission Staff Working Document: Kosovo under UNSCR1244/99 2009 
Progress Report. Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2009) 1340, 
Brussels.  
58 For this reason, Kosovo’s government and the ICO have adopted a Strategy for the 
Northern Mitrovica, which attempts to establish constitutional supremacy over the 
latter (Radio Free Europe, Kush eshte pjese e strategjise se Veriut? Radio Free 
Europe. Available at: http://www.evropaelire.org/content/Article/1931637.html).  
59 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 3, para 1. 
60 According to the Kosovan Statistical Institute, Kosovo’s population is composed 
of: Albanians – 92 percent, Serbs – 5.3 Serbs, Turkish – 0.4%, Roma – 1.1 %, and 
Others – 1.2% (Kosovan Statistical Office, Report for ‘Ndryshimet Demografike te 
popullsise se Kosoves ne periudhen 1948–2006’. Series no 4: Statistics of Population. 
Available at (April 15 2010): http://www.ks-
gov.net/ESK/index.php?opinion=com_docman&task=cut_view&gid=8&Itemid=8).  
61 The citizenship regime produced by the Kosovan Constitution is argued to have an 
inclusive approach, meaning that multi-ethnicity is reflected in the design of Kosovan 
citizenship. See: Krasniqi G  “The Challenge of Building an Independent Citizenship 
Regime in a Partially Recognized State: The case of Kosovo” (2010) CITSEE 
Working Papers Series 2010 paper no 04 available at: 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/citsee/workingpapers.  
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creating a positive discrimination in favor of minorities which can be 
practically observed in the institutional context.62  
In addition, the Constitution determines that: “Kosovo is a democratic 
Republic based on the principle of separation of powers and the checks and 
balances among them as provided in this Constitution”.63 Hence, the 
Constitution enacts the principle of the separation of powers: it establishes 
that the Assembly shall exercise the law-making powers,64 the president shall 
represent the unity of the people,65 and the government shall execute the laws 
and policies.66 In this vein, the Constitution establishes the judiciary as the 
law-controlling and interpreting body67 and the Constitutional Court as the 
final interpreter of the Constitution.68 One may therefore argue that the 
separation of powers principle materializes through an institutional triangle 
consisting of the Assembly, the government and president, and the judiciary, 
whereas the Constitutional Court should ultimately guard the overall 
constitutional order. This system of the separation of powers also enacts the 
principle of checks and balances; however, the proclamation of the principle 
of checks and balances could have no meaning if it does not materialize in the 
state itself. Therefore, observation over time will indicate whether this 
principle has materialized substantially.  
The Constitution’s section on basic provisions addresses another 
important issue – the official language. The Constitution determines that: 
“The official languages in the Republic of Kosovo are Albanian and 
Serbian”,69 moreover, “Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status 
of official languages at the municipal level or will be in official use at all 
levels as provided by law”.70 As a result, the Constitution recognizes two 
official languages and authorizes other languages to be used officially at the 
municipal level. It is worth noting, however, that the Kosovan population, as 
evidenced by Kupchan, is made up of roughly 90 percent Albanians—most of 
the rest is either Serbian or another ethnic minority.71 As such, the 
                                                     
62 Pond, E. “The EU’s test in Kosovo” (2008) The Washington Quartely Vol 31 no 4 
97–112. 
63 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 1.  
64 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 2. 
65 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 3. 
66 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 4. 
67 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 5. 
68 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 4, para 6. 
69 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 5, para. 1.  
70 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 5, para. 2. 
71 Kupchan A C  “Independence for Kosovo: Yielding Balkan reality” (2005) Foreign 
Affairs Vol  82 no 6 14–20.  
CALLING THE KOSOVO’S CONSTITUTION: A LEGAL REVIEW 
 
 
64 
Constitution offers a well-grounded multi-ethnic logic of official languages,72 
which contributes to the multi-ethnic nature of the state, given the importance 
of the use of language in the citizen-state relationship.73 In addition to the 
language, the Constitution determines that Kosovo’s state symbols should 
represent the multi-ethnic character of the state, thus disregarding single-
ethnic symbols for the polity.74 To this end, inter alia, the Kosovan 
Constitutional Court has dismissed the emblem of the Municipality of Prizren, 
considering that, as determined by the Constitution, it does not sufficiently 
represent all ethnic groups that live in the city.75 This has led to many public 
contestations;76 however, the international community has welcomed this 
decision, acknowledging that the Kosovan Constitutional Court is adequately 
preserving the constitutional principle of multi-ethnicity.77  
Other important determinations that the Constitution provides in the 
section on basic provisions include the proclamations for a market economy, 
the preservation of cultural heritage, freedom, peace, and others. 
One of the most important determinations that the Constitution delivers 
concerns the Constitution’s legal position. The Constitution specifies that: 
“The Constitution is the highest legal act of the Republic of Kosovo. Laws 
and other legal acts shall be in accordance with this Constitution”,78 [and that 
the] “the power to govern stems from the Constitution”.79 To this extent, one 
may argue that the Constitution is the highest [human] legal act of the polity, 
and no other legal norm can compete or override the Constitution. As argued 
near the end of this paper, this proclamation conflicts with another provision 
of the Constitution itself. Still, one might argue that the principle of 
constitutional superiority is here at least proclaimed and determined. 
Moreover, in this section the Constitution establishes that the power to govern 
                                                     
72 For more, see Lantschner E “Protection of Minority Communities in Kosovo: 
Legally ahead for European Standards – Practically still a long way to go” (2008) 
Review of Central and East European Law Review Vol 33 451–490. 
73 This links directly to the standards of the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages 1992, European Treaty Series no 148. Council of Europe.  
74 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 6 para 1. 
75 Case no KO01/09 Qemajl Kurtisi vs Municipal Assembly of Prizren Ref no 
AGj07/10, Constitutional Court of Kosovo, March 18 2010. 
76 “Kundershtohet Vendimi i Gjykates Kushtetuese per Emblemen e Prizrenit”, 
Kosova Info (Prishtine). Available at (April 12 2010): 
http://www.kosova.info/2010/03/kundershtohet-vendimi-i-gjykates-kushtetuese-per-
emblemen-e-prizrenit/ (published on March 24 2010).   
77 News Release “Ruling of Constitutional Court supports Community Rights—ICR”. 
No 04/2010 of March 24 2010 available at (April 15 2010): http://www.-
kos.org/2/100319_CC_PRIZREN_emblem_eng.pdf.  
78 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 16, para. 1. 
79 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 16, para. 2. 
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stems from the Constitution only, establishing the Constitution as both the 
source of and limit upon Kosovo’s governance. Having proclaimed and 
determined itself as the highest legal act, the Constitution has, in fact, 
determined itself – as Hans Kelsen’s grundnorm, that is “the basic norm that 
constitutes the unity in the multitude of norms by representing the reason for 
the validity of all norms that belong to this order”.80 To this extent, the 
abovementioned provision of the Constitution of Kosovo imitates or creates 
the Constitution as the grundnorm – or the peak – of Kosovo’s legal system. 
Still, this is only a proclamation, so the issue of whether the Constitution can 
stand as a grundnorm needs to be more deeply analyzed. It is important to 
remember that the Ahtisaari Plan, a document in competition with the 
Constitution, has also proclaimed itself as a basis for the Constitution of 
Kosovo, and, in doing so, the plan declares itself superior to the Constitution. 
As a result, the position of the Constitution of Kosovo vis-à-vis the Ahtisaari 
Plan remains a contested matter, especially given the status settlement’s 
obligations undertaken by Kosovo. However, although this issue is contested, 
the search for a grundnorm in the Kosovan legal order continues to be 
indefinitely linked with the abovementioned proclamation of the Constitution.  
The remaining elements of the Constitution’s basic provisions section 
cover international agreements, the applicability of international law, and the 
delegation of sovereignty. To provide external sovereignty, the Constitution 
authorizes the polity to enter into international legal instruments and to 
become part of international organizations.81 However, as of this writing, 
Kosovo has been part of only two international organizations – the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.82 This potentially weakens 
Kosovo’s international position. In contrast to the international organizations, 
the Constitution provides that “ratified” parts of international law will – upon 
ratification by the parliament – become automatically part of the internal law 
of Kosovo. This establishes a monist system of relations between domestic 
and international law,83 whereas, in practice, the Constitution and the practical 
challenges to the latter have created dualist elements. Still, some 
constitutional provisions remain relatively illogical in terms of the position 
that ratified parts of international law deliver vis-à-vis the Kosovan legal 
                                                     
80 Kelsen Hans (1970) “The pure theory of Law” Translated by Knight, Max from 
Reine Rechtslehre  (Berkley: University of California Press, 2nd edition, 1960) p 195. 
81 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Articles 17 & 18.  
82 Press Release No 2009/658 “Kosovo joins the IMF and WB” United States 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. June 29 2009.  
83 For more about the monist system, see: Shaw M QC International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Sixth edn, 2009); and Hillier T Sourcebook 
on public international law.  (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1998) 
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system, and they complicate the position of constitutional norms amid the 
norms of the latter.  
Ultimately, in the basic provisions section, the Constitution authorizes 
state institutions to delegate state sovereignty to international organizations 
and establishes the procedure for doing so. That is, of course, an authorization 
for the polity vis-à-vis the European Union integration process, given that 
direct constitutional powers are recognized to the polity so as to be able to 
delegate sovereign powers to the European Union.  
Having surveyed the basic provisions section of the Constitution, the 
analysis moves on to an examination of its provisions for the governing 
system.  
 
KOSOVO’S TOP GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS 
 
The second part of the paper reviews the Constitution’s provisions which 
establish and regulate the top governing institutions, or—in particular—the 
Assembly, the government, the president, and the judiciary, including the 
Constitutional Court. Although one may appreciate the Constitution of 
Kosovo for its standard of democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, and 
identification of human rights,84 a deeper review may indicate whether any of 
these principles have not been well-provided.  
 As Marko asserts, the relationship between the three branches of the 
polity suggests that the Constitution of Kosovo delivers a parliamentarian 
system of governance.85 However, the Pufendorfian notion of sovereignty 
would not fit well with the powers articulated by the Constitution. “To 
summarize Pufendorf’s understanding, to legislate, to judge, to determine war 
and peace, to raise armies, to levy taxes, and to enforce the will decreed in the 
legislation is what it means to be sovereign”.86 Hence, either the 
authorizations provided by the Constitution are lacking or it does not actually 
authorize the polity to engage in wars, to raise armies, and to provide 
unrestrained legislation, which can be seen as a limit on what defines a 
Pufendorfian-sovereign constitution. The examination begins with the 
constitutional provisions provided for the Kosovan Assembly. 
 
 
                                                     
84 Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244) Administrative Legal Framework, Assessment of 
May 2009, Sigma Programme’s Report for Kosovo (financed by the OECD & EU).  
85 Marko J “The new Kosovo Constitution in a regional Comparative Perspective” 
(2008) Review of Central and East European Law Vol 33 437–450. 
86 Pufendorf cited at: DeHart Paul R Uncovering Constitution’s Moral Design. 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007) p 74. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
67 
ASSEMBLY 
 
The Constitution establishes that: “The Assembly is the legislative 
institution of the Republic of Kosovo directly elected by the people”.87 This 
provision relates two specific things: first, that the Assembly is the law-
making body of the polity; and second, that the people directly elect the 
members of the Assembly. In addition to the Assembly’s power to make laws, 
the Constitution assigns others, including the power to appoint and dismiss 
the government,88 the power to appoint and dismiss the president of 
Republic,89 the power to ratify international agreements,90 the power to 
approve the budget of the state,91 the power to propose Constitutional Court 
judges,92 and others. Thus, the Constitution establishes the Assembly not only 
as a law-making body, but also as a peoples’ representative body, capable of 
appointing and dismissing high-level officials for the governing institutions of 
the state. In this context – given that the Assembly is the only people-elected 
body in the polity – its power to articulate the peoples’ sovereignty makes it 
the most legitimate body in the polity, as determined by the Constitution.  
The Constitution93 specifies that the Assembly shall have 120 members, 
elected through a proportional system.,94 Out of these 120 members, the 
Constitution reserves twenty places for the representatives of minorities.95 
This constitutional guarantee which reserves places for representatives of 
ethnic minorities ensures that no ethnic minority goes unrepresented in the 
Assembly96 no matter the outcome of the popular vote. The guaranteed 
parliamentary seats for ethnic minorities ensure a multi-ethnic Assembly, 
thereby excluding the possibility for majority overrule. According to the 
Constitution, every ethnic minority which exists in Kosovo’s territory shall 
                                                     
87 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 63.  
88 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 65, para 8. 
89 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 65, para 7. 
90 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 65, para 4. 
91 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 65, para 5.  
92 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 65, para 11. 
93 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 64, para 1. 
94 United States has appreciated the standard of the first elections held under the 
authority of the Kosovan Constitution. See: Press Release on “Kosovo’s first elections 
since independence”. United States Department of State. November 16, 2009. 
Available at (April 11 2010): http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/131994.htm. 
95 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 64, para 1 subpara 1 & 2. 
96 Currently, there are three parliamentary groups that belong to ethnic minorities in 
the Kosovan Assembly, with more than twenty members from the ethnic minorities’ 
communities. Available from the Assembly’s website: http://www.assembly-
kosova.org/?cid=2,192.  
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have guaranteed seats in the Assembly, with the Serbian minority having the 
highest number of guaranteed seats (10).97 
The Constitution specifies that the Assembly shall be chaired by a 
president,98 with at least two of the Assembly’s deputy presidents coming 
from the ethnic minorities’ members. According to the Constitution, the 
president and deputy-presidents of Assembly shall be appointed on the basis 
of a relative majority, whereas their dismissal can take place only if a majority 
of two-thirds vote in the Assembly.99  
The members’ mandate, according to the Constitution, is free, given that 
members “are representatives of the [whole] people [as opposed to a portion 
of constituency] and are not bound by any obligatory mandate”.100 That means 
that members have no constitutional obligation vis-à-vis their strict electorate 
– the members’ mandate is free and not linked with the electorate’s will. The 
Constitution recognizes that the members have a representative mandate 
unconstrained by their electorate’s desires; hence, they represent the whole 
people of Kosovo, despite from whence their votes derived. In addition, the 
Constitution determines that once a Kosovan is at least 18 years old, he/she is 
eligible to become a member. Moreover, the composition of the Assembly 
“shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality”.101 
Therefore, the Constitution recognizes and establishes the gender balance 
principle in the Assembly’s composition, meaning that, despite the popular 
vote, women shall take member positions at a certain percentage (i.e., one-
third of the Assembly should be composed of women, according to the 
Electoral Law of Kosovo).   
As per the Constitution, “A member of the Assembly of Kosovo shall 
neither keep any executive post in the public administration or in any publicly 
owned enterprise nor exercise any other executive function as provided by 
law”.102 This provides a clear division between the members of the Assembly 
and the members of the government or other state institutions. Also, members 
of the government cannot simultaneously hold the position of member of the 
Assembly, so that those in the Assembly voting to appoint the government 
will have clear relationships.   
                                                     
97 Most of these, according to Hughes, have been imposed by the international 
community through the Ahtisaari Settlement. See: Hughes J “EU conflict 
management policy: Comparing the security-development model in the ‘sui generis’ 
cases of Northern Ireland and Kosovo”. Paper presented at the European Consortium 
for Political Research, September 10–12 2009, Potsdam, Germany. Available at: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26061/. 
98 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 67, para. 2. 
99 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 67. 
100 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 70, para. 1. 
101 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 71, paras 1&2. 
102 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 72.  
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The members of the Assembly are granted immunity “from prosecution, 
civil lawsuit and dismissal for actions or decisions that are within the scope of 
their responsibilities as deputies of the Assembly. [However] the immunity 
shall not prevent the criminal prosecution of deputies of the Assembly for 
actions taken outside of the scope of their responsibilities as deputies of the 
Assembly”.103 Therefore, although members have a limited immunity, the 
judiciary branch members cannot prosecute members of the Assembly. This 
style of immunity is similar to that granted to representatives and senators in 
the United States Congress. 
The Constitution provides the Assembly with the capacity to regulate its 
own procedural function through the adoption of an internal regulation. This 
requires the assent of at least two-thirds of the members.104, 105 Furthermore, 
the Constitution assigns to the Assembly the power to establish permanent or 
ad hoc committees; investigative committees may be established at the request 
of at least one-third of members.106 The investigative committee requirements 
allow any opposition political party to request that an investigative committee 
be established, thus creating the possibility to wield formidable opposition 
parliamentary power. In a similar vein, the Constitution determines that there 
shall be a permanent Committee on the Rights and Interests of [ethnic] 
Communities, which shall control the representation of ethnic communities’ 
interests in the law-making process. 107 
One of the most important matters determined by the Constitution is the 
legislative initiative. The Constitution establishes that the initiative for 
adopting a law may “be taken by the President of the Republic of Kosovo 
from his/her scope of authority, the government, deputies of the Assembly or 
at least ten thousand citizens as provided by law”.108 Thus, a number of 
different actors may initiate the adoption of a law in the Assembly. Moreover, 
a legislative initiative could be initiated by any of Kosovo’s ten-thousand 
citizens, which makes the Assembly ‘open’ in terms of law initiatives. 
The Constitution sets forth that laws are adopted at the Assembly if the 
majority of members present vote in favor of the law. The law adopted by the 
Assembly should be promulgated by the President of Republic within eight 
days of its adoption. The president may use a suspensive veto against a law, 
                                                     
103 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 75, para 1.  
104 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 76. 
105 The current regulation has been adopted under the authority of the former 
constitutional framework, issued by UNMIK. See: Assembly of Kosovo “Rules of 
procedure of the Assembly of Kosovo” approved on May 20 2005 and amended on  
June 1 2006. 
106 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 77. 
107 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 78. 
108 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 79. 
CALLING THE KOSOVO’S CONSTITUTION: A LEGAL REVIEW 
 
 
70 
which sends it back to the Assembly. The Assembly can then override the 
president’s veto by using the same majority that it used for its adoption. If the 
law is adopted by the Assembly a second time, then it is automatically 
promulgated, without the need for the President of Republic’s signature. The 
entry into force of an adopted and promulgated law should take place fifteen 
days after the given law has been publicized in the Official Gazette of 
Kosovo.109  
The Constitution makes a distinction between usual laws and vital interest 
laws. In that context, the Constitution determines that a law of vital interest 
requires a double majority in the Assembly for adoption. Laws of vital interest 
can be adopted, amended, or abrogated only if the majority of the Assembly, 
and majority of those holding guaranteed seats (i.e., reserved seats) in the 
Assembly, vote in favour of it.110 This double-majority for laws of vital 
interest, as opposed to a common majority, makes the participation of ethnic 
minorities crucial in the adoption process of vital laws.111 If the vital interest 
law fails to garner a double-majority, this essentially constitutes an ethnic-
minority veto of any law that might constrain their interests. Yet, as Marko 
argues, this is not a one-ethnic-minority absolute veto and may not be used by 
one ethnic group only for blocking all of the others.112  
Ultimately, the Constitution regulates the manner through which the 
Assembly might be dissolved. It specifies that the Assembly can be dissolved 
under three circumstances: first, when the government with a decreed prime 
minister cannot take the votes for appointment in the Assembly; second, when 
the Assembly fails to appoint the President of Republic for a certain period of 
time; and third, when the members themselves require the dissolution.113 
 
PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT 
 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
 
The Constitution of Kosovo provides a bi-cephalic executive branch, 
meaning that there shall be a president and a government headed by a prime 
minister. The Constitution establishes that: “The president is the head of state 
                                                     
109 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 80. 
110 For more about the double majority procedure in the Kosovan vital laws’ case, see: 
Tansey O  Kosovo “Independence and Tutelage (2009) Journal of Democracy. Vol  
20 no 2 153–166. 
111 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 81, para 1. 
112 Marko J “The new Kosovo Constitution in a Regional Comparative Perspective” 
(2008)Review of Central and East European Law Vol  33 437–450. 
113 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 82. 
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and represents the unity of the people of the Republic of Kosovo”.114 This 
fundamental power held by the President of the Republic (hereafter, 
“president”) is formal, meaning that nothing substantial can be acquired by 
the president if he/she represents the unity of the people. The manner of 
appointment of the president required by the Constitution leaves questions as 
to whether the president can be a true representative of the people’s unity 
remains to be. 
In addition, the Constitution specifies that the president shall represent the 
state internally and externally,115 shall guarantee the Constitution’s 
performance,116 shall promulgate laws adopted by the Assembly,117 shall 
return laws to the Assembly for reconsideration,118 shall sign international 
agreements,119 can propose amendments to the Constitution,120 shall lead the 
foreign policy of the country,121 shall be the chief of Kosovo’s Security Force 
(Army),122 shall decree the candidate for Prime Minister from the party that 
has won the majority of seats in the Assembly,123 shall appoint and dismiss 
judges and prosecutors upon the proposal of Kosovo’s Judicial Council and 
Kosovo’s Prosecutorial Council,124 shall appoint the commander of Kosovo’s 
Security Force upon proposal of the government,125 shall appoint the governor 
of the central bank,126 shall appoint the chair of the Electoral Commission,127 
shall appoint the ambassadors and the head of the Intelligence Service upon 
the proposal of the government, shall declare states of emergency,128 and so 
forth.  
Prior to analyzing the president’s powers, one must understand how the 
Constitution determines the election of the president. The Constitution 
specifies that the president shall be appointed by the Assembly via a two-
thirds vote of the whole Assembly. “If a two thirds (2/3) majority is not 
reached by any candidate in the first two ballots, a third ballot takes place 
between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes in the 
                                                     
114 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 83. 
115 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 1. 
116 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 2. 
117 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 5. 
118 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 6. 
119 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 7. 
120 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 8. 
121 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 10. 
122 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 84, para 12. 
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second ballot, and the candidate who receives the majority of all deputies of 
the Assembly shall be elected as President of the Republic of Kosovo”.129  As 
a result, the president is likely to be elected from a coalition of parties or from 
the party that holds the government (i.e., the one that has 50 percent plus one 
(1) members in the Assembly).130 The president’s election will usually end in 
the third round of voting, given that the coalition of parties or the party 
holding the majority in the Assembly will most likely require the seat of the 
president. As a result, president will likely be a political tool of the majority 
party (or coalition of parties) in the Assembly; therefore, no political 
independency can be assumed to be delivered by the president per se.131 The 
underlying reasoning for powers of the president, especially those in the 
judiciary sphere, conflict with the manner of the presidential election 
specified in the Constitution. It follows that one should not assume that the 
president’s position within the political context represents the unity of the 
people, given that the manner in which the president is elected preconditions a 
partisan president, rather than a non-partisan (i.e., comprehensive) one. Still, 
the powers of the president granted by the constitution do make him or her a 
constitutionally powerful president.  
The Constitution grants a mandate of five years for the president and 
allows reelection only once.132 Moreover, it sets forth that the president, while 
in office, can exercise no partisan functions, meaning that the Constitution 
prohibits the president from holding a partisan affiliation and/or position.133 
Despite this limitation, the current Kosovan president holds both the position 
of president of the LDK party and the position of President of Republic, 
having legally ‘frozen’ his position within the LDK.134 This is considered, 
however, a gap within the Constitution itself; this contest has generated many 
clashes within the Kosovan party politics.135 The Constitution does not specify 
whether ‘freezing’ one’s position in one’s party, while continuing to hold it 
formally, is sufficient to make one eligible to hold the position of the 
                                                     
129 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 86, para 5. 
130 The current president comes from LDK, which is a part of the coalition of political 
parties that hold the government. See: Platforma e Sejdiut per LDK Gazeta Express 
available at (April 20 2010): 
 http://www.gazetaexpress.com/web/index.php/artikujt/lexo/28976/C4/C13. 
131 See, for instance: Rikonfirmohet koalicioni LDK-PDK BBC in Albanian available 
at (April 21 2010): 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/albanian/news/2009/11/091120_kos_partner.shtml. 
132 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 87.  
133 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 88.  
134 Kryetari “i ngrirë” cakton ministrat, Koha Net, available at (April 21 2010): 
http://www.kohaditore.com/index.php?cid=1,22,17097. 
135 Ditelindja e Kushtetutes Gazeta Express available at (April 21 2010): 
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President of Republic. Nonetheless, many argue that the Constitution 
prohibits a President of Republic with double positions.136  This issue has not 
yet been ruled on by the Constitutional Court.  
The Constitution has established a relatively complex procedure for 
dismissing the president:  
 
“If the President of the Republic of Kosovo has been convicted of a 
serious crime or if the Assembly in compliance with this article 
determines that the President is unable to exercise her/his 
responsibilities due to serious illness, or if the Constitutional Court 
has determined that he/she has seriously violated the Constitution, the 
Assembly may dismiss the President by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its 
deputies”.137  
 
The Constitution strongly protects the president’s mandate, and as such, it 
widely restricts the possibility for dismissal and allows the undertaking of the 
dismissal process only with two-thirds of the vote, as opposed to the majority 
of votes necessary for his or her election. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
 
The Constitution establishes that the government “consists of the Prime 
Minister, deputy Prime Minister (s) and ministers”,138 and its function is to 
“exercise the executive power”139 of the state, which consists of implementing 
the “laws and other acts adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo”.140 Therefore, 
the government is the most powerful part of the executive branch. In 
particular, the Constitution specifies that the government can propose and 
implement the internal and foreign policy of the polity,141 promote  economic 
development,142 propose laws and issue sub-laws,143 propose the budget of the 
state,144 direct the public administration of the country,145 propose the 
appointment of ambassadors and other chiefs of independent institutions in 
                                                     
136 Radio Free Europe, ‘Kushtetuta nuk lejon poste te dyfishta’. Available at (April 01 
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137 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 89, para 3. 
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139 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 92, para 2. 
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Kosovo, and other similar duties. The Constitution determines that the 
government shall be headed by a prime minister, whose office shall have 
individual competences, as opposed to those of the government as a whole.146 
Moreover, the prime minister has the capacity to remove a minister of his/her 
government without the assent of the Assembly.147 The prime minister’s 
position is relatively powerful as a matter of the constitutional arrangement, 
i.e., stronger than that of a primus-inter-partes prime minister. Because of 
these stipulations, the prime minister shall head the government and be able to 
direct and demand accountability from his/her ministers. Here, the 
Constitution provides for a powerful prime minister, whose powers make him 
or her a proper chief of the government (or at least provide him or her with the 
option to become one). 
The Constitution requires that the government be appointed by the 
Assembly with a majority of votes. As a preliminary step, the President of the 
Republic shall decree the prime minister from the party or coalition that has 
won the majority of seats in the Assembly, whereas the prime minister shall 
compose the government and send it up for a vote in the Assembly.148 Yet:  
 
“…if the proposed composition of the government does not receive 
the necessary majority of votes, the President of the Republic of 
Kosovo appoints another candidate with the same procedure within 
ten (10) days. If the government is not elected for the second time, the 
President of the Republic of Kosovo announces elections, which shall 
be held not later than forty (40) days from the date of 
announcement”.149 
 
As relates to the ministries, the Constitution determines that the number of 
ministries and their functioning shall be regulated with an internal act of the 
government.150 It also determines that there must be a minimum of two 
ministers in any government representing ethnic communities,151 one of 
whom should come from the Serbian minority.152 As such, the Constitution 
offers a rich, ethnically plural government, given the obligation to include 
                                                     
146 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 94. 
147 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 94, para 4. 
148 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 95, paras 1, 2 & 3. 
149 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 95, para 4. 
150 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 96, para 2. 
151 Three ministries are currently led by ethnic minorities’ representatives (two of 
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National Democratic Institute October 2008, Prishtina. 
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ministers from the ethnic communities, exclusive from the votes in the 
Assembly.  
In terms of responsibility, the Constitution determines that the government 
shall be responsible to the Assembly for its work. The responsibility can be 
required individually or collectively.153 Thus, in order to forge an inflexible 
link between the people’s legitimacy and the executive branch, the 
Constitution establishes a proper parliamentary-controlled government. It 
follows that one may consider this governing system to be purely 
parliamentarian.  
The Constitution has bestowed the government and its members with 
immunity.154 In addition, it establishes that the dismissal of the government 
may be undertaken if a motion of non-confidence against the government 
passes successfully with a majority of votes of all members of Assembly.155  
Overall, the Constitution provides no special protection for the 
government from the Assembly; however, the style of the governing system 
provides that the majority of the Assembly functions as a tool of the prime 
minister or the government as a whole. Thus, the Assembly does not possess 
true control of the government, given the strict partisan linkage between the 
majority of members in the Assembly and the holders of government 
positions.  
 
JUDICIARY 
 
The Constitution determines that the judicial branch of power shall be 
exercised by courts156 and provides that “judicial power is unique,157 
independent, fair, apolitical and impartial and ensures equal access to the 
courts”.158 This constitutes a range of formal guarantees that the Constitution 
delivers vis-à-vis the judiciary. To that end, the Constitution establishes the 
judiciary an accurate interpreter and controller of the law. It guarantees the 
right to appeal first-level judicial decisions to a higher judicial level,159 thus 
                                                     
153 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 97.  
154 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 98. 
155 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 100.  
156 Kosovo Constitution 2008, Article 102, para. 1. 
157 Currently, the justice system in the North of Kosovo is dysfunctional, hence, in 
practice, it cannot be described as an indivisible justice system, as proclaimed by the 
Constitution. See: Probleme me funksionimin e gjykatave ne veri BBC in Albanian 
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acknowledging that the judicial system is based on the double-tier 
interpretation of law (ie, the principle of appellation). 
 The Constitution states that there shall be a Supreme Court, as the 
highest judicial institution, which shall ultimately judge whatever cases are 
raised. The Supreme Court shall have at least three judges who come from the 
ethnic communities. In addition, the terms of the Supreme Court judges shall 
last seven years and be elected by the president of Kosovo upon the proposal 
of Kosovo’s Judicial Council.160 
The Constitution requires that other courts in Kosovo be established and 
regulated by law. The appointment of judges in all other courts in Kosovo is 
decreed by the president upon the proposal of Kosovo’s Judicial Council. 
Furthermore, the Constitution specifies that the “composition of the judiciary 
shall reflect the ethnic diversity of Kosovo and internationally recognized 
principles of gender equality”.161 Similarly, the Constitution establishes that 
the “initial mandate for judges shall be three years… The reappointment 
mandate is permanent until the retirement age as determined by law or unless 
removed in accordance with law”.162 In addition, the Constitution prohibits 
the establishment of extraordinary courts.163 
The Constitution establishes Kosovo’s Judicial Council as an institution 
which guarantees the independent functioning of the judiciary. To that end, 
Kosovo’s Judicial Council is composed of members who are appointed by the 
judiciary itself, by the Assembly of Kosovo, and in particular, by the members 
of Assembly who hold reserved seats.164 In that context, Kosovo’s Judicial 
Council is constitutionally independent vis-à-vis the executive and legislative 
branch. Thus, the control over the judiciary’s performance has been 
preconditioned to be accurate. Similarly, Kosovo’s Judicial Council shall be 
able to make mandatory nominations of judges at all levels, propose 
mandatory dismissals of judges, and perform disciplinary measures upon 
judges if malpractice occurs.165 Kosovo’s Constitution authorizes the Judicial 
Council to develop rules for the functioning and organization of the judiciary, 
subordinate to the relevant laws.  
The Constitution establishes the position of State Prosecutor, which is “an 
independent institution with authority and responsibility for the prosecution of 
persons charged with committing criminal acts and other acts specified by 
law”.166 In addition, it establishes the Prosecutorial Council, an institution that 
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is mandated to deliver nominations for prosecutors as well as proposals for 
dismissing prosecutors, and generally ensures that the functioning of the 
prosecutorial system is lawful and constitutional.167  
Overall, the Constitution provides a relatively stable basis for the 
judiciary’s independence, largely ensured by the powers of Kosovo’s Judicial 
Council. To that end, the constitutional protection of the judiciary’s 
independence is well equilibrated with the two other branches of governing 
system. However, the judiciary faces serious performance challenges,168 
leading to potentially serious breaches in the Constitution of Kosovo’s 
prescription for a functional and independent judiciary.169 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
The Constitution empowers the Constitutional Court to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of laws and decisions. As such, the Constitution establishes 
that: “The Constitutional Court is the final authority for the interpretation of 
the Constitution and the compliance of laws with the Constitution”.170 The 
Constitutional Court, therefore, essentially controls the application of the 
Constitution and, as such, takes the necessary steps to enable its accurate 
application. In particular, the Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court 
to interpret the constitutionality of laws, governmental regulations, and 
decrees issued by the prime minister and the president.171 In addition, it has 
the jurisdiction to resolve conflicts of competences between the President of 
the Republic, the Assembly and the government, decide on the 
constitutionality of a proposed referendum, review the constitutionality of a 
declaration of a state of emergency and those actions undertaken during such 
a state, control the constitutionality of a proposed constitutional amendment 
with the binding international agreements, and control the constitutionality of 
elections for the Assembly.172 Moreover, the Constitution assigns to the 
Constitutional Court the rights to control the constitutionality of municipal 
statutes and to judge any potential constitutional infringement caused by the 
President of Republic.173 In all of these jurisdictions, only institutional actors 
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can initiate the procedure before the Constitutional Court; citizens are not 
authorized by the Constitution to do so.  
One might ask whether the Constitution allows individuals to raise 
questions and file appeals at the Constitutional Court. The Constitution does 
allow individuals to raise questions of constitutional rights and abuses of 
freedoms in Constitutional Court, provided that all other judicial remedies 
have been exhausted.174 This is the only time when individuals can raise a 
question in the Constitutional Court; therefore, the Constitution provides 
citizens a limited opportunity in which to question constitutionality at the 
Constitutional Court level. As such, this bias against the citizens may be 
considered a democratic deficiency, since an unconstitutional law, for 
example, cannot be challenged by individuals at the Constitutional Court. 
Hence, the Constitution, in this context, denies the public an opportunity to 
directly participate in challenging the unconstitutionality of an act. 
This raises the question of whether the Constitutional Court can ex officio 
exercise its jurisdiction, without the need for an appeal from an institutional 
actor or individual. The Constitution provides no ex-officio powers for the 
Constitutional Court; therefore, the court’s authority, more or less, depends on 
institutional or individual requests. 
The Constitution requires that the Constitutional Court have nine judges, 
appointed by the President of the Republic upon the proposal of the 
Assembly. Seven of the judges are to be proposed by two-thirds of the 
Assembly, with two judges to be elected by the majority of Assembly after 
gaining the consent of the members holding reserved seats (minority 
members).175 The judges of the Constitutional Court shall have immunity,176 
and their dismissal can take place only if two-thirds of its judges recommend 
the removal and the President of Republic issues a decree concurring with 
their recommendation.177 In contrast to the appointment process of the court 
overall, the transitory provisions of the Constitution require that, in the 
transitory period, three of the judges of the Constitutional Court not be 
Kosovan citizens – instead, they are to be appointed by the International 
Civilian Representative upon consultation with the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights.178   
Given the analysis above, the governing system installed by the 
Constitution may be considered to be a purely parliamentarian system. As a 
consequence, the Assembly remains the only route through which the 
people’s legitimacy may be employed; therefore, the Assembly exercises both 
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the representation function and the law-making function. As such, the 
Assembly has control over both the government and the president. The 
judiciary is free from this political control, so its independence remains 
relatively well-protected.  
In contrast, the president holds a wide range of powers—not commonly 
found in purely parliamentarian systems of governance; however, in practice, 
the president should be appointed by a parliamentarian majority which 
simultaneously holds the government. Given this, the Constitution’s 
authorizations for the president, and especially the powers that the president 
holds over the judiciary, make no sense in legal-rational terms, since a 
president who comes from the same parliamentarian majority that holds the 
government can offer the judiciary no protection. In that context, most of the 
powers of the president have no logic vis-à-vis the mode of appointing the 
president. Therefore, the Constitution makes it highly likely that the president 
and the Assembly will be controlled by the coalition or the party in control of 
the government.179 In addition, given the president’s manner of appointment, 
no semi-presidential elements are apparent in the Constitution.  Similarly, the 
only powerful obstacle which could be set forth against the government is 
parliamentary opposition—which can block some of the laws and form 
investigative commissions (from a constitutional point of view). Taken as a 
whole, the Constitution produces a purely parliamentarian governing system 
where the separation-of-powers principle is widely applied.  
 
THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF CITIZENS 
 
The Constitution creates an environment rich with human rights and 
liberties.180 Given the conflicts that appeared and persisted between Albanians 
and Serbs after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, it guarantees special protection instruments for ethnic minority 
citizens.181 However, in general, the Constitution forms the basis for almost 
every right and liberty a citizen possesses.182 The Constitution’s framers 
                                                     
179 For more on the importance of the political supervision of the Assembly upon the 
government, see: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2006) 
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considered the human rights provisions to be a core responsibility of the new 
document. In addition, the Ahtisaari Plan had set forth its own human rights’ 
guarantees that later became accepted as constitutional elements. The 
Constitution also delivers direct-applicability powers to a wide range of 
international legal instruments. Thus, the Constitution accepts and provides at 
least three sources of human rights guarantees: first, the constitutional 
guarantees of rights and liberties; second, the Ahtisaari Plan’s guarantees of 
rights and liberties; and third, the international legal instruments to which the 
Constitution per se refers. These are reviewed in this section. 
Kosovo’s Constitution establishes that: “Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are indivisible, inalienable and inviolable and are the basis of the 
legal order of the Republic of Kosovo”.183  It then states that: “The Republic 
of Kosovo protects and guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
provided by this Constitution”.184 
In more substantial terms, the Constitution guarantees the right to be equal 
before the law;185 the right to life;186 the right to personal integrity;187 the right 
to be protected from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;188 the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labor;189 the right to liberty and security;190 
the rights of the accused;191 the right to fair and impartial trial;192 the right to 
legal remedies;193 the principle of legality and proportionality in criminal 
procedures;194 the right not to be tried twice for the same criminal act;195 the 
freedom of movement;196 the right to privacy;197 the right to marriage and 
family;198 the freedom of expression;199 and many other rights and liberties. 
Although the Constitution seems to enact a high standard when it comes to 
those rights and liberties which are guaranteed, the Freedom House Report 
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argues that the Constitution200 limits the freedom of expression if the freedom 
concerned is used for fueling ethnic conflicts.201 This, however, may be 
negatively interpreted from a liberal human rights perspective and might 
contradict some of the international legal instruments on human rights.  
The second element of the constitutional protections of human rights 
consists of the international legal instruments of which the Constitution 
recognizes their direct applicability in Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo accepts 
and employs the doctrine of incorporation, given that the instruments 
concerned automatically take effect in the domestic law.202 In light of that, the 
Constitution states that:  
 
“Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following 
international agreements and instruments are guaranteed by this 
Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in 
the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other 
acts of public institutions: 
 
(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
(2) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; 
(3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
Protocols; 
(4) Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities; 
(5) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; 
(6) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women; 
(7) Convention on the Rights of Children; 
(8) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment”.203  
 
Furthermore, the Constitution declares, “Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with 
the court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights”.204 Along these 
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same lines, the direct applicability of international legal instruments in 
Kosovo provides a wide and rich environment for the guarantee and 
protection of rights and liberties. Similarly, as seen in this list of applicable 
conventions and agreements, the European Court of Human Rights’ case law 
is binding upon the Kosovan courts’ jurisdiction – this leads to a judicial 
system that should be compulsorily referred to the comprehensive system of 
European human rights.  
Overall, the Constitution provides a wide range of rights and liberties and 
recognizes the direct applicability of many international legal instruments in 
Kosovo’s legal system. In addition, the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights ‘Europeanizes’ Kosovo’s legal order, as a result of the 
Constitution’s prescription. Still, one totally illogical provision provided by 
the Constitution specifies that: “fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by this Constitution may only be limited by law”.205 With no rational basis for 
this, the authors consider it an unreasonable portion of the Constitution. 
 
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES 
 
The Constitution provides special guarantees for the members of ethnic 
minorities. As such, it offers a special constitutional position, as opposed to a 
rule of majority governance, to those minorities, thereby making their 
participation in public life and constitutional protection privileged.206 The 
Constitution declares that:  
 
“Inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious group traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of 
Kosovo (Communities) shall have specific rights as set forth in this 
Constitution in addition to the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms provided in chapter II of this Constitution207 . . . [and] Every 
member of a community shall have the right to freely choose to be 
treated or not to be treated as such, and no discrimination shall result 
from this choice or from the exercise of the rights that are connected 
to that choice”.208  
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Kosovo’s Constitution determines the responsibility of the state vis-à-vis 
ethnic communities and guarantees cultural autonomy for the communities 
concerned.209 In addition, it creates a Consultative Council of Communities, 
responsible for creating the institutional link between the ethnic minorities 
(represented in the Council) and the institutional structures.210 In a similar 
way, the Constitution guarantees that the “communities and their members 
shall be entitled to equitable representation in employment in public bodies 
and publicly owned enterprises at all levels”,211 meaning that a true 
representation of ethnic minorities in public institutions and services is 
constitutionally assured. However, given the Serbs’ boycott of participating in 
the institutions and the existence of parallel Serbian-government-funded 
institutions, these provisions are being challenged in practice; therefore, the 
guarantees concerned are, in many cases, rejected by the Serbian minority in 
Kosovo. This is most likely leading to a practical and/or political dismissal of 
the constitutional principle of multi-ethnicity by the Serbs themselves.212  
Taken as a whole, one may consider the Constitution to be a 
consociational constitution, given that the ethnic minorities’ constitutional 
position, both in the context of institutional representation and in that of rights 
and duties, is based on the consociational model of democracy213—as opposed 
to a majoritarian model of democracy. Consociational democracy, according 
to its founder Arend Lijphart, is a model of governance that “makes plural 
societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken 
segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments 
into constructive elements of stable democracy”.214 Therefore, overall, the 
Constitution of Kosovo creates a position for the minorities’ that is well 
protected, liberally recognized, and politically empowered. This supports the 
argument that the Constitution is a consociational one, though Hughes 
contests this claim by arguing that there is no longer a vibrant communitarian 
minority in Kosovo that can take part in a fully functional consociational 
system of governance.215 
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KOSOVAN CONSTITUTION’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
AHTISAARI PLAN 
 
The position of the Constitution appears to be relatively subordinate to 
that of the Ahtisaari Plan.216 In regard to this issue, the Constitution states:  
 
“The Constitution, laws and other legal acts of the Republic of 
Kosovo shall be interpreted in compliance with the Comprehensive 
Proposal for Kosovo’s Status Settlement dated 26 March 2007. If 
there are inconsistencies between the provisions of this Constitution, 
laws or other legal acts of the Republic of Kosovo and the provisions 
of the said Settlement, the latter shall prevail”.217  
 
Although the Ahtisaari Plan is thought to have legal authority over the 
Constitution, however, one might still argue that the Ahtisaari Plan is legally 
empowered by the Constitution itself, given that the United Nations did not 
approve it. From that perspective, the Constitution’s section recognizing its 
subordination to the Ahtisaari Plan could be amended, therefore leading to a 
Constitution with no acknowledgment of the plan’s authority. Yet, as Hughes 
asserts, “the universal Albanian view is that the ‘multi-ethnic’ framework will 
be removed by the Kosovan government or will be superseded by a new 
constitution or legal framework within ‘a few years’, as the current system 
lacks ‘local ownership’, it seems inevitable that it will be superseded in due 
course”.218 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 
 
The Constitution of Kosovo sets forth that the Constitution’s amendment 
“shall require for its adoption the approval of two-thirds (2/3) of all deputies 
of the Assembly, including two-thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly 
holding reserved or guaranteed seats for representatives of communities that 
are not in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo.”219 Therefore, the ethnic 
communities’ position in the constitutional amendment process is equal with 
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that of the majority. Given this equality, the ethnic minorities’ members in the 
Assembly can veto a constitutional amendment, thereby totally blocking it. 
This provision of the Constitution has ensured that the constitutional 
guarantees for ethnic minorities cannot be altered unless the ethnic minorities 
themselves agree to it. As such, the Constitution provides a rigid amendment 
process, leading to a rigid constitutional model.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper has reviewed the most vital parts of Kosovo’s Constitution and, 
while reviewing each of its segments, has summarized the essential 
arguments. This paper reviewed the basic provisions of the Constitution and 
examined the constitutional components provided for the top institutions of 
the polity, its citizens’ human rights and liberties, the ethnic communities’ 
special rights and liberties, and, finally, the constitutional amendment process 
as well as the relationship between the Constitution and the Ahtisaari Plan. 
The most central segments of the Constitution aim to ensure the 
participation of ethnic communities in public life, in part, by guaranteeing 
their rights and liberties. In addition, the ethnic communities’ involvement in 
public life is both institutionally and substantially guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
The Constitution outlines a pure parliamentarian system of governance, 
wherein the Assembly is the only body of the state elected by the people. This 
makes the Assembly the only source of popular legitimacy in the whole 
governing system of Kosovo. As a result, both the government and the 
president are appointed by the Assembly and controlled—in one way or 
another—by it. Nevertheless, as presented herein, the Constitution shows no 
signs of making the Assembly independent from the government; instead, it 
preconditions an Assembly that is politically bound to the government, given 
that the coalition or party holding the government holds the absolute majority 
of seats in the Assembly. Admittedly, the judiciary’s independence is 
constitutionally well established, but no rationality for the president’s powers 
in that field could be found. 
One may conclude that the Constitution provides three bases of protecting 
human rights and liberties: that of the Constitution per se, that of the Ahtisaari 
Plan, and that of international legal instruments which have direct 
applicability in Kosovo, as a matter of the Constitution’s sanctioning. 
In conclusion, Kosovo’s Constitution exists as a consociational 
constitution, one that builds a system of governance dedicated to the 
protection of minorities vis-à-vis the majority’s rule. Ultimately, the 
Constitution is subordinate to the Ahtisaari Plan; this calls into question 
‘constitutional supremacy’ and leads to an innovative form of sovereignty.  
